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of Creolization 
Max Hantel 
Rutgers University 
Introduction: The Trace of Sexual Difference 
Throughout his work, Édouard Glissant rigorously describes the process of 
creolization in the Caribbean and beyond. His later work in particular 
considers creolization through the planetary terms of Relation, “exploded 
like a network inscribed within the sufficient totality of the world.”1 As his 
philosophical importance rightfully grows, many note the dual risk of 
overgeneralization and abstraction haunting continued expansion of his 
geographical and theoretical domain.2 In light of that danger, this essay 
examines how questions of the ontological nature of embodiment as raised by 
feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray ground, both implicitly and explicitly, 
processes of creolization. Narrowly speaking, such a reading of Glissant 
suggests the possibility of a richer understanding of creolization as a 
historically lived process and its emancipatory promise in the present. More 
generally, the linking of Glissant and Irigaray begins a larger project 
bringing together theorists of decolonization and sexual difference at the 
intersection of struggles against phallocentrism and racialization, perhaps 
nuancing some decolonial critiques of the value of Irigaray’s (and her 
interlocutors’) thought.3 Thus, the investigation begins with a concrete 
question of historical interpretation that stages the embodiment of cultural 
contact. 
The Comentarios Reales de los Incas (1609) is a vital text in the colonial 
history of Latin America. Written by Garcilaso de la Vega, known in his day 
as “El Inca” because of his Incan mother, the Comentarios represented the 
authoritative text on indigenous Peruvian culture for centuries. Written 
while he was in Spain, El Inca describes a childhood spent with his maternal 
relatives in Peru. It is this fusion of multiple perspectives, times and places 
that makes the Comentarios so important for considering the philosophical 
implications of racial and cultural mixing: a child born from a Spanish 
conquistador and Incan royalty leaves for Spain at twenty-one where he 
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articulates an elite version of his people’s history by translating the oral 
tradition of his Quechua-speaking family into Spanish.  
What becomes clear throughout this amazing text is how El Inca tries to 
negotiate the two sides of his identity through a dialectical sleight of hand. 
Caught linguistically, emotionally and spatially between Spain and Peru, he 
puts his proud Incan heritage at the service of a broader identification with 
the Spanish and Christian imperial project. That is, the Incas represented a 
crucial intermediary step in the cultivation of civilization that the finally 
perfected Spanish bring to fruition. So he dedicates his work to the empire of 
Christendom, “by whose merits and intercession the Eternal Majesty has 
deigned to draw so many great peoples out of the pit of idolatry…”4 The 
Inca are partially aligned with the Spanish in his version of their origins, 
then, because they brought at least a modicum of civilization to the various 
beastly peoples they conquered. While he laments the loss of some of the 
glories of Incan culture, and at times overtly wishes the Spanish would show 
the natives more respect, the monumentalism of Spanish teleology wins the 
day. He undertakes the task of writing about his love for his native country 
to displace flawed conceptions of its history at the same time dedicating his 
work to the discursive formations that ineluctably engender such violent 
misrecognitions. Thus, a pervasive part of his narrative is to render the 
animalistic and idol worshipping pre-Inca Indians as a common enemy of 
the Incas and Spanish. 
At least prima facie, then, it seems evident this narrative does not 
represent the radical shock of creolization “allowing each person to be there 
and elsewhere, rooted and open,” but instead captures cultural mixing “in 
the thought of an empire.”5 While a lengthier treatment of the text might 
point to a multiplicity of factors, here it serves as a point of departure to 
suggest one explanatory possibility for the frustration of creolization: the 
suppression of sexual difference. This claim is, for now, not a causal one but 
merely to say the capture of creolization by empire can be traced like a 
shadow through the constitutive darkness of sexual difference in the text.  
What Pheng Cheah calls “the trace of sexual alterity”6 marks the 
Comentarios both in its content and its material production. First, women’s 
bodies are the connective tissue in the dialectical sublation of Incan 
civilization to Spanish empire. In Chapter XIII, Garcilaso describes the dress 
of the Indians and shows heightened concerns about the indecency of 
women. “The women went in the same dress, naked…But out of proper 
respect for our hearer, we had better keep to ourselves what remains to be 
said…they resembled irrational beasts, and it can be imagined from this 
bestiality in adorning their persons alone how brutal they would be in 
everything else.”7 The women of a population as gatekeepers of domesticity 
and virtuous modesty repeatedly become metonymic for the whole state of a 
society. In settling the new villages of the Inca Empire, for instance, Incan 
ruler Manco Capac sounds rather close to a European colonizer in his 
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attempt to teach the “dictates of reason and natural law” to heathens. 
Women again figure prominently: “He enjoined them particularly to respect 
one another's wives and daughters, because the vice of women had been 
more rife among them than any other.”8 Proper modes of domesticity, 
measured primarily through women, are crucial to the civilizational 
narrative established by Garcilaso. In Book VIII he describes the torturous 
beauty practices of Incan women who desire long black hair. Wondering at 
how ridiculously severe such a treatment appeared, he notes, “However in 
Spain I have ceased to wonder, after seeing what many ladies do to bleach 
their hair by perfuming it with sulphure…I do not know which treatment is 
more injurious to the health, the Indian or the Spanish…This and much 
more will the longing for beauty induce people to undergo.”9 From his 
perspective, given here as more of a funny aside, the disciplining of the 
female body—however ridiculous—is a sine qua non of any claim to 
civilization. 
Even more glaring is the suppression of the maternal body. El Inca 
Garcilaso’s absorption of Incan culture into Spanish teleology structurally 
parallels how the repression of sexual difference framed his cultural 
identity: given the ideas about hereditary lineage prevalent then, he would 
assume that his paternal Spanish heritage dominated his maternal Inca 
heritage. His maternal lineage is subsumed in this model. El Inca Garcilaso 
is able to join the patriarchal economy of the father’s name since a Spanish 
conquistador declared in court: “…he is my natural son and as such I name 
and declare him.”10 The repression of the maternal body from which he 
came is doubled in the production of the Comentarios, transcribed by El Inca 
Garcilaso’s illegitimate son born from a servant who is now but a legal 
footnote in imperial Spanish history.11 The female servant haunts this 
complex account of a mixed identity, indexing the unspeakability of sexual 
difference under phallocentrism even within the supposedly radical 
potential of geographical and racial hybridity.12 
Based on the embodied questions raised here, the remainder of the 
article tries to further systematize the claim that irreducible sexual difference 
is a constitutive feature of processes of creolization and, conversely, that the 
suppression of sexual difference represents a particularly pernicious capture 
of creolization’s radical potential. To this end, both Édouard Glissant and 
Luce Irigaray confront the metaphysical power of the One through a radical 
poetics. They overlap particularly in their focus on the force of fluidity to 
overturn temporal stasis and spatial balkanization in how we conceive 
identity and relation. Juxtaposing them reveals how Glissant’s theory of 
creolization can obscure the ontological significance of sexual difference in 
the production of previously unimagined socio-cultural formations 
grounded in the creativity of the natural body, even as his theory acquires its 
force at least in part from the power of such an ontological formation. Thus, 
this paper is the first step in the development of a sexual difference theory of 
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creolization that contributes to the struggle against phallocentrism in all its 
manifestations, not least of all racialization.  
 
Creolization through the Mechanics of Fluids 
Édouard Glissant’s oeuvre theorizes the irreducible cultural and 
geographical specificity of the Caribbean in terms of an open multiplicity he 
calls a “poetics of Relation.” His challenge in general philosophical terms is 
to express how “every identity is extended through a relationship with the 
Other.”13 The Caribbean is the epicenter of this rhizomatic mode of identity 
he calls Creolization, held in contradistinction to the European model of 
filiation: “Relation rightfully opposes the totalitarianism of any monolingual 
intent.”14 Creolization for Glissant is not only the descriptive recognition 
that pure origins and monolingual insularity are illusory, but also the 
revalorization of the unpredictable and creative effects of cross-cultural 
encounters. 
The Martinican landscape suffuses Glissant’s many works. In his fiction 
and his theoretical tracts, he focuses on the beaches of his homeland—
caught between the mountains and the sea—as the revealing knot for his 
view of identity extended through the other. The mountains are the 
historical home of the Maroons who escaped slavery to set up their own 
society; the Caribbean Sea is the island’s opening onto the rest of the world. 
He privileges neither setting on its own terms, cautioning against the 
romanticizing of a mythic past as well as the fantasy of an unencumbered 
future. A Caribbean consciousness as the embodiment of a poetics of 
Relation cannot arise from either a narrow reclaiming of an authentic origin 
or a naively postmodernist view of unrooted identity. Thus, Glissant draws 
them together through Martinique’s Lézarde, the snaking river that cuts 
through the island as it descends from the hills to the open water, “[linking] 
the mountain, as ‘the repository of Maroon memories,’ with ‘the unfettered 
sea’ and therefore [linking] the tradition of the Maroon repudiation of the 
plantation to a new future…”15  
The river is central not only because it suggests a complex 
rapprochement between the reclamation of the past and a radical openness 
to the future, but because its very geophysical dynamics are suggestive of an 
identity in Relation. Describing how the Other destabilizes without 
annihilating, Glissant writes: “This is an aesthetics of turbulence whose 
corresponding ethics is not provided in advance. The other of thought is 
always set in motion by its confluences as a whole.”16 The fluvial dynamics 
of the I-Other and cross-cultural relationship are described here as flows 
undergoing confluence with unpredictable results, even for those flows that 
begin in a laminar state.    
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Creole linguistics, for Glissant, are a concrete example of turbulent flow. 
“An idiom like Creole, one so rapidly constituted in so fluid a field of 
relations, cannot be analyzed the way, for example, it was done for Indo-
European languages.”17 He is interested in the dynamic process of 
Creolization, as opposed to a study attempting to fix Creole in place (render 
a regularized written language) or articulate it as merely the sum of certain 
constituted languages. The creative possibility of Creole, in turn, brings into 
relief the ways celebrations of stasis or universality are merely fantasies built 
on the suppression of difference. So the standardization and imposition of a 
supposedly universal French language, for instance, mask a long-history of 
internal differentiation and struggle behind seemingly neutral rules of 
usage. Glissant sees two common pitfalls in approaches to Creole: the 
essentialist celebration of Creole as an authentic identity with origins in 
Africa that is superior to decadent and corrupted European identity (the 
Negritude of Senghor, for instance); or the assertion that Creole has 
sedimented enough that it should be considered on par with European 
languages in demarcating a foundational creole identity and range of 
cultural expression (the Creolité of Raphaël Confiant, Jean Bernabé and 
Patrick Chamoiseau).18 Neither of these approaches actually challenge the 
structural condition of monolingualism, which divides the world into neat 
and hierarchically distributed geographic and linguistic root identities: the 
former flips the hierarchy while the latter flattens it, but each leaves in place 
the boundaries that constitute the Oneness of cultural identity.  
The metaphysical comfort of the root is not easily escaped, however. 
While creolization never stops, according to Glissant, its radical potential is 
diffused by the hegemony of European filiation: 
One can imagine language diasporas that would change so rapidly 
within themselves and with such feedback…that their fixity would 
lie in change…This linguistic sparkle, so far removed from the 
mechanics of sabirs and codes, is still inconceivable for us, but only 
because we are paralyzed to this day by monolingual prejudice.19  
Until Caribbean thinkers find a way to articulate an imagination beyond this 
“monolingual prejudice” and to live the embodied radicality of creolizing 
identity, they will remain in the trap of a Eurocentric world where the only 
horizon is to become the New Europe or Europe’s equal. Or, as Fanon puts 
it, “Let us decide not to imitate Europe and let us tense our muscles and 
brains in a new direction. Let us endeavor to invent man in full, something 
which Europe has been incapable of achieving.”20 Fully living the aesthetics 
of turbulence—what Glissant calls the chaos-monde—by giving oneself up to 
a confluence with others makes possible the move from the totalitarian root 
of identity to the rhizome submerged in the open sea. 
What is not always clear in Glissant’s work, however, is the source of 
this transversal confluence. Or, in other words, if illusions of fixity and stasis 
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break into turbulence when irreducible but connected entities meet in 
Relation, how is their meeting initiated and embodied. I have already 
suggested in the introduction that women’s bodies are a crucial gateway in 
narratives of cultural encounter, as sexual difference marked an exemplary 
text in form and content through the trace of the repressed maternal body. 
Glissant himself articulates how his view of the rhizome over the root arose 
from a network of formative feminine figures:  
Pour notre culture, héritée des Africains, la famille est beaucoup 
plus étendue. Ce n'est pas seulement ma mère qui m'a élevé, mais 
aussi ma grand-mère, mes tantes, mes sœurs aînées, et même les 
voisines, une vaste famille très féminine, comme un matriarcat 
collectif dont la mère serait la figure centrale. Le père, lui, n'est 
jamais la. Le mien gérait des habitations, toujours en 
déplacements…La figure de ma mère, quand j'étais tout petit, reste 
donc associée à cette multiplications de visages féminins, à ces das, 
celles qui portent les bébés, nourrices, marraines et autres.21 
What is notable here is that the multiplicity of the world, the privileging of 
the rhizome over the root, and the valorization of difference against the 
flattening out of Eurocentric globalization are all expressed through the 
body of the mother without being reducible to it. In this sense, the body of la 
mère works in the same way as the body of la mer for Glissant, since his 
creolizing poetics are grounded in a corporeal landscape that is 
simultaneously the point of relation to the unpredictable chaos of the world. 
He argues, for instance, “La mer Caraïbe …est une mer ouverte, une mer qui 
diffracte…Ce qui se passe dans la Caraïbe pendant trios siècles, c'est 
littéralement ceci: une rencontre d'éléments culturels venu d’horizons 
absolument divers et qui réellement se créolisent.”22 In some sense, Glissant 
takes the force of fluidity for granted, detailing its historical power to 
envelop totalitarian boundary fantasies and scramble illusions of purity but 
never quite analyzing the ontological source of its effectivity. Far from 
accidental, however, la mer(e) in Glissant's work points to the way 
phallocentrism organizes materiality and identity. Turning now to the work 
of Luce Irigaray will bring into relief this fundamental if incipient 
relationship between creolization and sexual difference.  
In her challenging essay “Mechanics of Fluids,” Irigaray maps science’s 
“historical lag in elaborating a ‘theory’ of fluids” onto psychoanalytic 
discourses of desire. Why is it, she asks, that fluids can only be thought in 
terms of a teleology of solidification? And furthermore, how does a 
“complicity of longstanding between rationality and a mechanics of solids 
alone” enforce and maintain the centrality of the phallus and the phallic 
economy?23  
While this essay is often read only as a critique of scientific rationality, it 
is clear that Irigaray primarily targets the Lacanian theory of desire. Lacan 
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argues for instance, “The objet a is something from which the subject, in 
order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a 
symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it 
is lacking. It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and, 
secondly, that has some relation to the lack.”24 Upon entering the symbolic 
order—which means entering the psychic economy of the phallus25 based on 
acceptance of the name of the father, or the big Other—the subject’s desire is 
based on a constitutive lack because they are cut off from unmediated access 
to the real. To compensate for this lack, desire attaches to partial objects or 
objet a that, as Lacan says in the above quote, serve to demarcate boundaries 
of the subject and mark traces of the founding relationship to the Other. The 
exemplary case is feces precisely because it comes from within but is 
ultimately externalized, articulating the inside/outside boundary through 
the severing of an intelligible object.  
For Irigaray, this hierarchy of solids over fluids (or the teleological 
absorption of fluids into solids, such as the sperm-fluid always represented 
as the future child in psychoanalytic models of desire) is one way the 
centrality of the phallus is shored up in the face of the excess of fluidity. The 
penis is the literal model for this hierarchy, the rigid res extensa that contains 
fluidity within determinate borders in a visibly apprehended volume.  As a 
result, “The sex of the woman is an absence of sex, and that she can only 
have one desire: to possess a penis…It’s an attempt which constitutes the 
female sex as the complement and the opposite necessary to the economy of 
the male sex.”26 The excess of fluidity against which the phallus works is a 
feminine desire not founded on lack, indexed by the morphological 
possibility of an autonomous female sex: “These two lips of the female 
sex…return to unity, because they are always at least two, and that one can 
never determine of these two, which is one, which is the other: they are 
continually interchanging.”27 Irigaray is suggesting, in turn, that the phallus 
and the penis collapse into each other for Lacan: psychoanalysis and science 
are beholden to and reinforce a rationality founded on the mechanics of 
solids because language itself—the entire Western project of 
representation—stems from a model of desire in which there is only one 
value, the penis, promising access to the phallus. The various metrics of that 
value—extension, visibility, solidity, oneness—become the markers of the 
legitimate subject and authoritative locus of enunciation.  
On this idea, both that the Western project is founded on a binary of 
value and lack and that the mechanics of fluids disrupts the underlying 
metaphysics of this rational consensus, I believe Glissant and Irigaray are 
closely aligned. He looks to the chaos of the turbulent sea for how it 
destabilizes the political and scientific articulations of identity that rely on 
insularity, impenetrability and purity. Creolization constructs a subject in 
which discrete quantities of racial identity are blurred through the creativity 
of cross-cultural poetics such that the history of human interaction is no 
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longer centered on the model of the genealogical tree but in the chaos of the 
sea’s many currents, swirling eddies, and spiraling gyres. Political identity, 
moreover, spatializes these supposedly pure identities through the trope of 
the bounded and homogenous island: the territorial nation-state is like the 
insular island protected from penetration, contamination, or relation. For 
Glissant, the fluid movement of the sea undermines the fantasy of isolation 
through the submarine unity (to paraphrase Edward Kamau Brathwaite) of 
archipelagic thought. The Caribbean Sea distinguishes (without rendering 
distinct) and connects the islands it envelops and, by extension, brings the 
whole world into relation as it opens onto the uncontainable flows of the 
global water cycle.  
Thus, in terms of the philosophical, geographical, and scientific 
meaning of fluids, Glissant and Irigaray both highlight the way turbulent 
flow challenges the organizing principle of oppression on which they 
respectively focus. The preceding suggests that Glissant implicitly registers 
the power of sexual difference insofar as we take seriously Irigaray's 
theorization of fluidity. In this regard I break from the important work on 
Glissant's literary output that tends to compartmentalize his theoretical-
philosophical corpus as "under the guise of gender-neutral universalism."28 
At its most richly conceived, such as the preceding discussion of la mer(e), 
Glissant's idea of creolization draws strength from precisely what it shares 
with Irigaray's feminine theory of fluids. That is not to say, of course, that 
Glissant should unproblematically be read as a feminist or collapsed into 
Irigaray's project. While they both register the challenge of fluidity to 
formally similar philosophical conventions such as nature/culture, 
body/environment, or subject/object, they have different political horizons: 
for Irigaray, the mechanics of fluids disrupt a phallocentric economy of 
desire founded on lack; for Glissant, turbulent confluence undermines the 
“totalitarian root” of pure racio-cultural identity and its spatialization in the 
nation-state. In the next section, I want to further examine these different 
horizons to see whether Irigaray’s critique can map onto Glissant’s and, in 
turn, to consider how the discourse of creolization is sometimes rendered 
complicit in the silencing and invisibilization of the maternal body. 
 
Creolization, the Absent Maternal Body and Nature’s  
At-Least-Two 
While Glissant’s creolization proves very similar to Irigaray’s initial 
diagnosis of the science of solids, there is a second part of her argument—
the reason why a psychic economy organized around the phallus might rely 
on solids—that reveals a problematic tension in his privileging of fluidity. In 
short, the containing of fluidity in the form of a solid is a prerequisite for a 
patriarchal economy of exchange. As Irigaray bluntly and effectively puts it, 
“The society we know, our own culture, is based upon the exchange of 
women. Without the exchange of women, we are told, we would fall back 
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into anarchy (?) of the natural world, the randomness (?) of the animal 
kingdom.”29 
For women to be exchangeable requires the ossification of feminine 
desire into equivalent, discrete and so substitutable units. In “Mechanics of 
Fluids,” she highlights feces as the paradigmatic case of the objet a for this 
reason, because Lacan locates the child’s giving of the feces as an originary 
gift marking entry into the exchange economy. Lacan writes, “The anal level 
is the locus of metaphor—one object for another, give faeces in place of the 
phallus…Where one is caught short, where one cannot, as a result of the 
lack, give what is to be given, one can always give something else.”30 In 
other words, relating to the articulation of the partial object in the previous 
section, the lack at the heart of the phallic economy requires substitutability 
to work because, having entered through the symbolic only through the 
severing power of constitutive lack, the subject can never fully give back to 
the phallus. Hence the objet a, a partial object that simultaneously 
compensates for that lack and indexes its ongoing force, must be bounded 
and externalizable. So the subsumption of fluids by solids, and with it the at-
least-two of sexual difference by the One of the phallus, is crucial to the 
smooth functioning of a system of exchange ruled by men.  
In “Women on the Market,” from which the earlier quote about the 
exchange of women is taken, she considers that insight from Claude Lévi-
Strauss but pushes it further to examine how he naturalizes such an 
operation. Lévi-Strauss asserts the biological “scarcity” of desirable women 
produced by the innate tendency of man to polygamy explains women’s 
status as units of exchange; Irigaray instead tries to highlight the social 
production of the woman’s body as always reducible to “men’s business,” 
tracing out this “unknown infrastructure of the elaboration of that social life 
and culture.”31 
So the production and discipline of the desirable female body in the El 
Inca Garcilaso story, for example, would be read slightly differently by Lévi-
Strauss and Irigaray, with profound implications. For Lévi-Strauss, as for 
Garcilaso, the organized and collective exchange of women marks the move 
from nature to culture. Together they might say the Incas count as a 
redeemable civilization because of their strictures on the female form. 
Irigaray would agree with this idea, but simply add “under patriarchy” to 
their argument, suggesting that there is a socio-cultural process here based on 
asymmetrical power distribution and its mode of reproduction. While Lévi-
Strauss, and Irigaray after him, is primarily working within a single society’s 
horizon, the exchange of women also mediates cultural mixing. Even in a 
cross-cultural encounter, a third term is necessary (the woman’s body), 
through which men establish their relationship. The Incan ruler Manco 
Capac and the other indigenous people of Peru forge their bonds first 
through the disciplining of daughters and, once brought to the level of the 
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civilized, their exchange through marriage sanctioned by the name of the 
father. 
According to Irigaray, there are essentially three social roles for 
women in this patriarchal economy: mother, virgin and prostitute. In the 
example above of Manco Capac, the virgin as the site of “pure exchange” is 
at work: the daughters of one culture, presumed to be virgins, become 
decorporealized as they represent only the “sign of relations among men.”32 
Indeed, imagine if the indigenous communities encountered first by Inca 
kings had no daughters: there would be no cross-cultural exchange to speak 
of and the less powerful tribe of men would simply be slaughtered. The 
possibility of men’s relation hinges on the virgin as the site of their 
hom(m)osexual consummation.  
It is through the penetration of the hymen and the deflowering of the 
virgin that woman becomes mother. As mother, she no longer has exchange 
value but instead must be isolated in the home as private property. “As both 
natural value and use value, mothers cannot circulate in the form of 
commodities without threatening the very existence of the social order.”33 
That is, the power of the father’s name dissipates if the mother’s body is not 
spatially contained and possessed, monopolized by one patriarchal lineage. 
So-called cultural “hybridity” only becomes intelligible, such as the 
historical persistence of El Inca Garcilaso’s text, if it is put into circulation by 
the name of the father. In other words, despite the similar models of fluidity 
proposed by Irigaray and Glissant, there is a risk Glissant’s cultural 
turbulence still depends on the solidification and reduction of feminine 
desire when he fails to address sexual difference.34 
While she is elliptical in her criticism, I believe the Guadeloupean 
writer Maryse Condé’s engagement with Glissant produces a similar 
argument. She proclaims: “’Myth,’ writes Édouard Glissant in Caribbean 
Discourse (1989/1997), ‘is the first state of a still-naive historical 
consciousness, and the raw material for the project of a literature.’ No, retort 
the women writers in their own individual way. We have to rid ourselves of 
myths. They are binding, confining, and paralyzing.”35 There are two 
aspects of this argument worth exploring. First, she refuses the idea of a self-
styled Francophone Caribbean consciousness grounded in the imaginary of 
epic myths as a notably masculine project. Her language choice—binding, 
confining, paralyzing—points to the issue of embodiment, namely how 
women writers articulate the burden of bearing a national consciousness 
differently from the men who abstractly proclaim the birth of a new people. 
Second, and less explicitly, I think she is uncomfortable with how myth is 
projected as a higher-order of self-understanding that smuggles back in a 
subtle version of the nature/culture divide, which has historically (as 
Irigaray’s engagement with Lévi-Strauss shows, along with the story of El 
Inca) mapped onto women. 
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On the first point, it concerns Glissant’s metaphorization of birth in his 
description of the Caribbean’s historical predicament. He describes the 
middle passage as a constitutive abyss transforming fragmented African 
groups into the people of the Caribbean. In this founding act of violence, this 
forced diaspora, exist the generative resources for new modes of living 
together. Thus, he describes the slave ship in the following passage directly 
addressed to the original bearers of the legacy of slavery: 
[I]n your poetic vision, a boat has no belly; a boat does not swallow 
up, does not devour…Yet, the belly of this boat dissolves you, 
precipitates you into a nonworld from which you cry out. This boat 
is a womb, a womb abyss. It generates the clamor of your protests; it 
also produces all the coming unanimity. Although you are alone in 
this suffering, you share in the unknown with others whom you 
have yet to know. This boat is your womb, a matrix, and yet it 
expels you. This boat: pregnant with as many dead as living under 
sentence of death.36  
In this striking image, Glissant tries to hold onto the centuries of death and 
oppression inflicted on black bodies without becoming what Fanon calls “a 
slave to Slavery,” that is to ground Caribbean identity solely in a traumatic 
past.37 And so with death and suffering there is the language of pregnancy 
and generation. Victims of the slave trade are not only “dissolved” into the 
hold of the ship, but precipitated in a yet-unknown form; the ship 
“generates the clamor of [their] protests,” producing, in other words, new 
modes of resistance and political grammars; initially solitary, new 
relationships and communities form in the crucible of shared suffering. 
While beautifully compelling, one might ask in light of Irigaray’s 
critique in “Women on the Market” where the actual female body resides. 
The trace of sexual difference is marked in two absences. First, the slavery 
economy’s constitutive need to control female bodies is never discussed. 
Historical studies of nineteenth-century transatlantic slavery make clear that 
the valuation of female slaves based on their reproductive potential became 
the crucial engine of the plantation economy.38 As countries increasingly 
banned the continuing importation of slaves in the early 1800’s, slave 
owners poured resources into studying the female body and maximizing 
fertility to ensure the reproduction of their work force. Marie Jenkins 
Schwartz writes, “Women’s childbearing capacity became a commodity that 
could be traded in the market for profit. During the antebellum era the 
expectation increased among members of the owning class that enslaved 
women would contribute to the economic success of the plantation not only 
through productive labor but also through procreation.”39 The 
institutionalization of slavery and the racialization of society it precipitated 
came to rely on control over the female body and its reproductive capacity. 
While Glissant uses the metaphor of the womb abyss, Schwartz shows that 
the initial importance of the Middle Passage only led to a diasporic people 
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insofar as literal wombs could be alienated and coerced into carrying future 
slaves. In other words, the poetic rendering of the ship as the womb matrix 
of slavery obscures sexual difference by decorporealizing birth, suggesting 
all enslaved peoples equally experience the trauma of coerced 
reproduction.40  
Historically speaking, then, Irigaray’s controversial claim that “the 
problem of race is, in fact, a secondary problem—except from a geographical 
point of view”41 takes on a more complex tenor than simply a hierarchical 
mode of ranking oppressions. Her point in this context means one cannot 
struggle against the Manichaeanism of racial difference without 
simultaneously attending to sexual difference. It is not a question of 
prioritization for it’s own sake, but an ontological argument showing the 
way the suppression of sexual difference to an economy of the One is the 
“unknown infrastructure” upholding the violently demarcated boundaries 
of other socio-cultural differences. To fight against racial difference in a 
manner that replicates the patriarchal order’s suppression of feminine desire 
(in this case, the reduction of the female body to its reproductive capacity in 
the service of maintaining the plantation system) cannot create a radical new 
mode of collective life. This concern is at the heart of Condé’s declaration 
that West Indian women have had enough of myth: where Glissant is saying 
that the historical void left by the violent birth of the Caribbean people can 
only be filled by a new (masculine) poetics, Condé is reasserting the way 
women not only share in this historical erasure but also were singularly 
coerced into producing and reproducing it corporeally. So politically speaking, 
the suppression of sexual difference through the metaphorization of the 
womb allows Glissant to retrospectively assert a masculinized Caribbean 
identity that can birth itself in the contemporary moment.  
Of course, in proposing here a sexuate creolization, it is equally urgent 
to begin the reciprocal work of creolizing sexual difference. I do not mean to 
imply, in other words, that Irigaray’s relationship to race—and the historical 
institution of slavery in particular, omitted as it is in her discussions of the 
exchange of women—needs no investigation. My hope is that the affirmative 
reading strategy pursued in this article—reading the power of sexual 
difference as immanent to theories of creolization—makes possible a 
conceptual latticework built by Glissant and Irigaray together that moves 
beyond debates over prioritization and provides a creative solution to the 
challenge of philosophizing along colonial cartographies. In particular, two 
issues here demand caution to avoid the pitfalls of simply “correcting” 
Glissant with French theory: the geopolitics of intellectual history and the 
danger of “woman” becoming a false universalism. While the full extent of 
each concern is well beyond the scope of this paper, acknowledging their 
importance is crucial in articulating the confluence of phallocentrism and 
racialization.  
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What I have elsewhere called the “political economy of scholarly 
influence”42 in a discussion of Glissant’s relationship to Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari takes on an even more fraught valence in the case of bringing 
European feminism to bear on a Caribbean theory of racialization. That is to 
say, persistent asymmetries in philosophical work on the Caribbean and 
global South, which relegate non-European thinkers to the status of either 
derivative or illustrative (for example, Glissant read as a second-order 
Deleuzo-Guattarian or as an applied “example” of their work), might 
compound perniciously with ideological deployments of feminism as 
justification for imperial violence and demarcations of “modern” subjects.43 
As Glissant makes clear, however, establishing clean borders between 
properly European and authentically Caribbean thought merely reifies the 
power of colonial fantasy by obscuring the dense knots of intertwined 
history and conceptual exchange that hold together the poetics of Relation.  
That is, of course, not to dissolve geographical specificity into an 
undifferentiated mass where interconnection means indeterminacy. To the 
contrary, Glissant insists on the "itine ́raire géographique" of reason and a 
rigorous mapping of the landscapes through which creolization expresses 
itself.44 Hence, following Glissant—and Wynter as well who, perhaps more 
than any philosopher, has worked through the spatialization of ontological 
statements—one might respond affirmatively to Irigaray's provocation 
about the secondary status of race "except from a geographical point of 
view": just as creolization actualizes through sexual difference, the force of 
sexual difference (and a key axis of its suppression) is lived geographically 
in a world where the “color line” has determinate power over the politics of 
being. To articulate a politics of sexual difference, in other words, the 
geographical point of view is all we have because ontology is inevitably 
mediated by “ontologism,” as Wynter puts it, or the drive of particular 
statements about white, European man to colonize the generic category of 
the human on a global scale.45 Recognizing the historical impact of colonial 
cartographies suggests two avenues for creolizing sexual difference. First, it 
pushes back against either prioritization or category collapse by insisting on 
the ontological importance of sexual difference without reifying a particular 
experience of it. As Saidiya Hartman writes in the context of US American 
slavery: 
Can we employ the term 'woman' and yet remain vigilant that 'all 
women do not have the same gender?'…How can we understand 
the racialized engenderment of the black female captive in terms 
other than deficiency or lack in relation to normative conditions 
and instead understand this production of gender in the context of 
very different economies of power, property, kinship, race and 
sexuality?46 
Thus, insisting on the importance of sexual difference is not a final answer 
but actually an embrace of the condition of possibility of a future and a jump 
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into a shifting field of power relations. And second, it follows that the 
political drive to take up the force of sexual difference in the face of 
phallocentrism—to assert the power of the maternal body and the sexuate 
nature of life itself—requires attunement to precisely those bodies rendered 
liminal by racialization. Colonialism and slavery work to strip the 
ontological weight from those caught at the blurred edge of Western 
ontologism, leaving them with no “ontological resistance” in Fanon’s 
terms.47 Hence, Irigaray’s onto-political project must be made to speak 
precisely from a geographical point of view.   
Returning to the second point from Condé now, Glissant’s new poetics 
remains “masculinized’ insofar as he relies on a heroic vision of the cultural 
producer to manifest rhizomatic creativity against the idea of a neutral and 
inert nature. I realize this argument will seem implausible to many 
supporters of Glissant who rightly appreciate the ways he puts bodies and 
their landscapes into a reciprocally affective constellation. I do not want to 
diminish those parts of his text, but it is important to highlight how an 
omission of the ontological importance of sexual difference creates a fissure 
in his work such that the force of this body-landscape connection becomes 
the limited domain of a masculine poet. His definition of creolization is 
based on a distinction from mere métissage: “Parce que la créolisation est 
imprévisible alors que l’on pourrait calculer les effets d’un métissage. On 
peut calculer les effets d’un métissage de plantes par boutures ou d’animaux 
par croisements…[m]ais la créolisation, c’est le métissage avec une valeur 
ajoutée qui est l’imprévisibilité.”48 These lines are striking for how severely 
they diminish the creative power of sexual difference in nature, contending 
as he does that the genetic mixing of animals or plants is entirely 
predictable, calculable, and without political possibility.49 It only takes on 
radical possibility, he says, when the added value of unpredictability is 
imposed on a neutral and mechanistic nature. What makes this celebration 
of a second-order poetics disconcerting is how it links up with the already 
mentioned problem that Glissant omits how the policing and suppression of 
irreducible sexual difference (that is, ensuring fluid feminine desire is 
teleologically reabsorbed into bounded and rigid units of a phallic economy) 
is the mechanism by which patriarchal cultures come to interact and 
intermix. Together, these two points suggest what his privileging of a cross-
cultural encounter over nature’s suppressed sexual difference looks like in 
practical terms: the male gatekeepers of society entering into a relationship 
of cultural exchange that relies implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, on the 
degradation of the female body. Thus, he recapitulates the Lévi-Straussian 
view of a founding nature/culture divide mediated by, at the very least, the 
invisibilation of the female body. 
Is it possible to embrace a sexual difference theory of creolization that 
relies instead on Irigaray’s observation, “The natural is at least two: male 
and female…nature is not one.”50 When Irigaray says at least two, she 
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certainly does mean the irreducible sexual difference that is the natural 
engine of life. But, at the same time, it is important to realize that, in the 
wake of her “Mechanics of Fluids,” we must understand “at least two” 
beyond the economy of counting set up by the phallic economy. To say the 
natural is at least two, male and female, is not simply to add another discrete 
element to the quantifiable identities at play in the world: it is to begin from 
an entirely different ontology of life that reconceptualizes the relationship 
between bodies, languages, and landscapes in terms of a naturally 
unpredictable and dynamic poetics.  
For this reason, only a sexual difference theory of creolization can 
possibly realize Glissant’s vision of an “aesthetics of turbulence.” If theories 
of creolization only take place within the parameters of a phallic economy of 
counting—or more simply, if creolization is always articulated in a 
patriarchal grammar—it becomes the most banal form of multiculturalism 
celebrating the entry of a new group of men into the global elite. Cultural 
mixing can be exchanged on the global market by way of women’s bodies as 
well. Through Irigaray, theorists of creolization have the conceptual 
resources to articulate feminine desire beyond constitutive lack, to reinsert 
the female body into the narrative of the literal birth of a new people, and to 
fight the solidification of identity into a knowable and countable form. This 
theory of creolization reinvigorates the radical connections between 
landscapes, bodies and history by focusing on the ways sexual difference 
makes possible and mediates the affective force of Caribbean cultural 
identity. Maryse Condé reminds us, “In a Bambara myth of origin, after the 
creation of the earth and organization of everything on its surface, disorder 
was introduced by a woman…In a word, disorder meant creativity.”51 The 
chaos-monde starts with irreducible sexual difference.     
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